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Regulation and the New York
Court of Appeals: J. Zeevi &
Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank
(Uganda), Ltd.
JOHN S. WILLIAMS*
One of the objectives of the International Monetary Fund, founded by
the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1945,1 has been to unify the treatment
which exchange control regulations receive in the courts and adminis-
trative agencies of member countries. Pursuant to this goal, the Agree-
ment which created the Fund incorporated the following provision as
Article VIII, section 2(b):
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unen-
forceable in the territories of any member. In addition, members may,
by mutual accord, co-operate in measures for the purpose of making the
exchange control regulations of either member more effective, provided
that such measures and regulations are consistent with this Agreement.2
The first sentence of this section has been the most litigated provision
of the entire Agreement, and a number of New York cases established a
* A.B. 1957, Oberlin College; LL.B. 1960, Cornell University; LL.M. 1973, McGill
University; Member, New York Bar.
1. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 2322, 2 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter cited as Fund Agreement].
2. Fund Agreement, art. VIII, § 2(b). For a detailed discussion of this provision, see
Williams, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Exchange Control Regulations Under the Inter-
national Monetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1975).
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strict interpretation of the clause.3 In May of 1975, however, the New
York Court of Appeals apparently made a bold departure in its struggle
with -extraterritorial enforcement of exchange control regulations by
embracing the "national policy of cooperation with Bretton Woods sig-
natories" and an "expansive application of the IMF agreement."' Yet
scarcely a month later the same court by unanimous opinion'in J. Zeevi
& Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd.5 seemingly reversed
direction and reverted to an extremely narrow and possibly illusory
interpretation of the first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b). Unfor-
tunately, the court flatly rejected without discussion the application of




In the main, the facts in the Zeevi case were not in issue. The plain-
tiffs sought to recover $406,846.80 on an irrevocable international letter
of credit.' This claim arose after Hiram Zeevi Company (Uganda), Ltd.,
an Israeli corporation, deposited with the defendant, Grindlays Bank
(Uganda), Ltd., some 3,000,000 Ugandan shillings in March of 1972. In
consideration of this deposit, Grindlays issued an irrevocable letter of
3. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1968); Banco do Brasil S.A. v. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235,
239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); Southwestern Shipping Corp.
v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y.
533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953); Brill v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 14 App. Div. 2d 852, 220
N.Y.S.2d 903 (1st Dep't 1961); Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka Nat'l Corp., 140 N.Y.S.2d
323 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 286 App. Div. 999, 145 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1955); In re
Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 129 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sur. Ct. 1954); De Sayve v. De La Valdene,
124 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1953); In re Theresie Liebl's Estate, 201 Misc. 1102, 106
N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sur. Ct. 1951); In re Maria Liebl's Estate, 201 Misc. 1092, 106 N.Y.S.2d
705 (Sur. Ct. 1951); Cermak v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
aff'd mem., 275 App. Div. 1030, 91 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1st Dep't 1949); Kraus v. Zivnostenska
Banks, 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
4. Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. John Doe No. 1, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 599, 331 N.E.2d
502, 507, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, 539-40, cert. denied, - U.S. - (1975). The Banco Brasi-
leiro case id discussed by the present author in 70 AM. J. DT''L L. 101 (1976).
5. 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, cert. denied, U.S. - (1975),
noted in 9 INT'L LAW. 795 (1975).
6. 37 N.Y.2d at 223, 333 N.E.2d at 170, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 895. The Zeevi plaintiffs also
sought to recover $203,423.40 on a second letter of credit but the Court of Appeals did not
emphasize this claim since it found it submerged in unresolved questions of fact. Because
the pertinent issues of law on both claims are the same for our purposes, only the facts
regarding the claim for $406,846.80 will be highlighted.
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credit in favor of the plaintiff, J. Zeevi & Sons, in the amount of
$406,846.80. The credit (a) provided for payment, commencing April 15,
1972, in ten equal monthly installments against clean drafts drawn on
Zeevi Uganda, the depositor, and (b) authorized the negotiating bank
to seek reimbursement, i.e. payment, from the First National City
Bank, New York (Citibank). Allegedly "the whole purpose of the trans-
action between the parties was to transfer funds from Uganda to New
York." 7
As the apparent result of the strident anti-Israeli policy of President
Amin of Uganda, officials of the Bank of Uganda, acting with the au-
thority of the Minister of Finance under the Ugandan Exchange Control
Act,I issued directives in late March and April of 1972 instructing Grind-
lays to make no foreign exchange payments pursuant to the letter of
credit. Grindlays advised Citibank accordingly. In December 1972 and
January 1973 Chemical Bank, the negotiating bank, presented ten
drafts drawn on Zeevi Uganda to Citibank for payment, but Citibank
returned the drafts unpaid.
In the meantime, Zeevi had commenced suit by order of attachment
on Grindlays' funds on deposit with Citibank. In September of 1973
Zeevi moved for summary judgment on its claim for $406,846.80 and
Grindlays cross-moved for summary judgment. The New York Supreme
Court granted Zeevi's motion and denied Grindlays', and Grindlays
appealed. The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously af-
firmed without opinion 0 and, once again, Grindlays appealed. In June
of 1975 the New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the Appel-
late Division in an opinion holding (1) that New York substantive law
is controlling because "New York has an overriding and paramount
interest in the outcome of this litigation" as the "financial capital of the
world;"'" (2) that the doctrines of impossibility of performance and act
of state do not apply in bar of Zeevi's claim; 12 and (3) that Article VIII,
7. This was a memorandum decision made denying the Bank's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. The same comment was repeated in a decision on the present motion.
J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., Civil No. 24330/72 (Sup. Ct.,
Dec. 18, 1973), at 16.
8. The Exchange Control Act of Uganda, Laws of Uganda, c. 158 at 3017 (Rev. ed. 1964).
This Act is modeled upon and is similar to the English Exchange Control Act of 1947, 10
& 11 Geo. 6, c. 14.
9. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., Civil No. 24330/72 (Sup.
Ct., Dec. 18, 1973).
10. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 44 App. Div. 2d 914, 355
N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1974).
11. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 333
N.E.2d 168, 174, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 898 (1975).
12. Id. at 228, 333 N.E.2d at 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement does not bar Zeevi's claim, for "even
when read in its broadest sense" that provision "fails to bring the letter
of credit within its scope, since said letter of credit is not an exchange
contract."' 3 Then the court, quoting from Banco do Brasil S.A. v. Israel
Commodity Co.," discredited but a month before, 5 stated:
...IT his court [has] frowned on an interpretation of said provision
of the Bretton Woods Agreement which 'sweeps in all contracts affecting
any members' exchange resources as doing considerable violence to the
text of the section. '8
With deference to the Court of Appeals, the primary issue in the case
was not whether the substantive law of Uganda or New Yoik controlled,
but rather whether the first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b) was
applicable. Only if that provision does not control is inquiry into the
federal act of state doctrine and Ugandan law in order.
II
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
A. THE STARTING POINT: ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(B)
Courts in the United States, like those in all members of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, have the obligation to assure that section 2(b)
is appropriately applied in litigation which comes before them, by virtue
of the fact that the Fund Agreement binds the sovereign rather than the
parties."7 When the first sentence of that section appears to control,
13. Id. at 229, 333 N.E.2d at 174, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
14. 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906
(1964).
15. In B~mco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. John Doe No. 1, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 331 N.E.2d
502, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534, cert. denied, - U.S. - (1975). See note 4 supra and accompa-
nying text.
16. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 333
N.E.2d 168, 174, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 900.
17. Fund Agreement, arts. I and XX, § 2(g). See also Banco do Brasil S.A. v. Israel
Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 190 N.E.2d 235, 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1968);
Judgment of April 27, 1970, 23 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFr 1507, discussed in Gold,
The Fund Agreement in the Courts-X, 19 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 468, 476 (1972). In this
connection, it has been argued that the court and not the parties has the burden to
establish consistency of the exchange control regulations with the Fund Agreement, G.
DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FINANCING 295 (1967), and that the court has the obligation not to enforce an exchange
contract whether or not the parties plead and prove unenforceability. See the Fund inter-
pretation of the first sentence of article VIII, § 2(b), 1949 IMF ANN. REP., App. XIV, at
82-83; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 112-13 (7th issue 1975); 14 Fed. Reg. 5208-209 (1949); Delaume,
[Vol. 9:239
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analysis must begin with whether it actually does so. In Zeevi it is
strongly arguable that the sentence does govern,'8 since the facts in
Zeevi clearly raise the issue of the extraterritorial effect, if any, to be
given to Ugandan exchange control regulations. This issue is not gov-
erned by traditional private international conflict of laws rules, for the
first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b) has been superimposed upon
private international law, as both official IMF interpretations' 9 and de-
cisional authorities0 have held.
B. THE LETTER OF CREDIT AS AN EXCHANGE CONTRACT
To consider the applicability of section 2(b) only begins the analysis,
for the Court of Appeals ruled that the letter of credit in Zeevi was not
an "exchange contract" within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Fund
Agreement. 2' On the contrary, it seems clear that the letter of credit is
an "exchange contract." The word "contract" in this provision has no
unique meaning; rather, it connotes a legally binding agreement or un-
dertaking as usually understood in both common and civil law jurisdic-
tions.22 The contract dealt with by the court in the Zeevi case was a
On the elimination of the conflict of laws in monetary matters accomplished by the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, and the limitations thereof,
81 J. Daorr INT'L 333, 356-60 (1954); J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE Courrrs 81-82
(1962); F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 448 (3d ed. 1971); Williams, supra note
2, at 361-62.
18. See notes 21-38 infra and accompanying text.
19. See the Fund interpretation of art. VIII, § 2(b), in 1949 IMF ANN. REP., App. XIV,
at 83: An exchange contract contrary to the exchange control regulations of a member
"will be treated as unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international law
of the forum, the law under which the exchange control regulations are maintained or
imposed is not the law which governs the exchange contract or its performance." This
interpretation is binding on domestic courts. See International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development & International Monetary Fund v. All America Cables and Radio, Inc.,
17 F.C.C. 450 (1953), 8 Radio Reg. 927 (1955), discussed in GOLD, supra note 17, at 20-27,
55-59. See also J. GOLD, INTERPRETATION BY THE FUND 31-42 (I.M.F. Pamphlet Series No.
11, 1968) and cases cited therein; Williams, supra, note 2 at 332.
20. de Boer, Widow Moojen v. Von Richart, 51 REv. CRrr. DRorr INT'L PRrvt 67 (1962),
89 J. DROIT INT'L 718 (Cour d'appel Paris 1962), discussed in GOLD, supra note 17, at 143-
53. But see Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d
6 (1953); In re Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 129 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sur. Ct. 1954). See also A.
DICEY & J. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 920 (9th ed. 1973); Meyer, Recognition of Exchange
Controls After the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867, 896 (1953);
MANN, supra note 17, at 399.
21. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 333
N.E.2d 168, 174, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 900 (1975).
22. A. DIcEY & J. MORRIS, supra note 20, at 944; Meyer, supra note 20, at 886-88. But
see MANN, supra note 17, at 440, arguing that it would be "inappropriate to attribute a
strictly technical meaning to the word 'contracts.'"
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letter of credit, which must be distinguished from the agreement of
Grindlays Bank to issue the letter in consideration of the deposit by
Hiram Zeevi & Company (Uganda), Ltd. The funds subject to this letter
of credit were payable against drafts without accompanying documenta-
tion, and thus this letter was a "clean" letter and not a documentary
letter of credit subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Docu-
mentary Credits.? Under both the laws of New York and of Uganda, also
a common law jurisdiction,2M letters of credit are considered contracts
separate and distinct from the underlying transaction.2 Thus, by any
test, the letter of credit in Zeevi was a "contract" within the purview of
Article VIII, section 2(b).
The question, then, is whether the letter of credit was an "exchange
contract" within the scope of that provision. The meaning of the term
"exchange contract" remains locked in substantial controversy. Three
defifnitions have been offered. The narrow view, favored by Professor
Nussbaum, 26 endorsed in dicta in Banco do Brasil S.A. v. Israel Com-
modity Co., 27 and apparently resurrected by the New York Court of
Appeals in Zeevi,2M is that an "exchange contract" is a contract which
has as its immediate object the exchange of international media of pay-
ment, usually the exchange of one currency for another.29 The second
23. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-102 & Official Comment 1 with UNIFORM
CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (rev. 1974) promulgated by
the International Chamber of Commerce.
24. Record at 90-91, J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 44 App.
Div. 2d 914, 355 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1974) (uncontroverted affidavit of Oliver John
Keeble, Sept. 25, 1973, in support of defendant's cross motion): "The law of Uganda is
based upon, and virtually identical in all respects to, the common law of England." For a
general background of the importation of English law into Uganda, see D. BROWN & P.
ALLEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF UGANDA 37-42 (1968); H. MORRIS & J. READ,
UGANDA: DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAW AND CONSTITUrION 237-60 (1966).
25. This is the view in England. See 3 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 137 (4th ed. 1973)
and cases cited. See also O'Meara Co. v. Nat'l Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 395, 146 N.E.
636, 639 (1925); Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
26. Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J.
421 (1950); A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 542.43 (1950).
See also Cabot, Exchange Control and the Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved Puzzle, 99 U.
PA. L. REV. 476, 495 (1951).
27. 12 N.Y.2d 371, 375, 190 N.E.2d 235, 236, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874. See also Brill v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 14 App. Div. 2d 852, 852-53, 220 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904-905 (Ist Dep't
1961) (Botin & Steuer, JJ., dissenting).
28. See quotation accompanying note 16 supra.
29. See authorities cited in note 26 supra. See also Judgment of July 7, 1959 (unpub.
lished) in [1958-59] E. DROBNIG, SAMMLUNG DER DEUTSCHEN ENTSCHEIDUNGEN ZUM INTER-
ZONALEN PRIVATRECHT No. 135A, at 369, discussed in Gold, The Fund Agreement in the
Courts - VIII, 11 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 457-65 (1964); Emek v. Bossers & Mouthaan, [1957]
[Vol. 9:239
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suggested interpretation, that an exchange contract is a contract by
which one party promises to pay a sum of money in the currency of a
country whose exchange control regulations prohibit the transaction,
was advanced by Dr. F.A. Mann in 1947.3 Dr. Mann has since aban-
doned this view,3' and it has been criticized by other writers32 and disre-
garded by the courts.3 The third suggestion is the broad view that
"exchange contracts" are those contracts which "in any way affect a
country's exchange resources."3 1 That is, an exchange contract is a con-
tract which, when performed, would increase or decrease in an economic
sense the amount of foreign exchange or other international reserves
which are under the control of the country whose currency is involved,
i.e., the country whose resources are affected. This broad construction
of "exchange contracts," which implements the economic intent of the
Fund Agreement, has been adopted in a number of court decisions.35
Pasicrisie Luxembourgeoise 35, [1955] Int'l L.R. 722 (1953). Compare the Clearing Dol-
lars Case (Chamber for Commercial Affairs, Hamburg Landgericht), [1955] Int'l L.R. 730
(1954), discussed in GOLD, supra note 17, at 82-86; and Frantzmann v. Ponijen, [1960]
N.J. No. 290 (Dist. Ct., Maastricht, Neth.), [1966] Int'l L.R. 423 (1959).
30. Mann, The Exchange Control Act, 10 MOD. L. Rzv. 411, 418 (1947).
31. See Mann, Money in Public International Law, 26 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 259, 279
(1949); Mann, The Private International Law of Exchange Contracts under the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Agreement, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 97, 102 (1953). See also MANN,
supra note 17, at 441-42.
32. GOLD, supra note 17, at 54 n.38; Williams, supra note 2, at 337.
33. See Banco do Brasil S.A. v. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 375-76, 190
N.E.2d 235, 236, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964), refusing
to apply this interpretation.
34. MANN, supra note 17, at 441; Gold & Lachman, The Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund and the Exchange Control Regulations of Member States,
89 J. DRorr INT'L 666, 674 (1962); Williams, supra note 2, at 337-44. See also GOLD, supra
note 17, at 92-93; J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BusiNEss
TRANSACTIONS 25 (I.M.F. Pamphlet Series No. 3, 1965); J. GOLD, THE CUBAN INSURANCE
CASES AND THE ARTIcLES OF THE FUND 27-35 (I.M.F. Pamphlet Series No. 8, 1966); MANN,
supra note 17, at 442-44; and Meyer, supra note 20, at 888.
35. Lessinger v. Mirau, [1955] Int'l L.R. 725 (Oberlandesgericht, Schleswig 1954),
discussed in GOLD, supra note 17, at 90-94; Societe Filature et Tissage X. Jourdain v.
Epoux. Heynen-Bintner, [1957] Pasicrisie Luxembourgeoise 35 (Tribunal
d'Arrondissement de Luxembourg), [1955] Int'l L.R. 727 (1956), discussed in GOLD, supra
note 17, at 94-96; de Boer, Widow Moojen v. Von Reichart, 51 Rav. Cart. Daorr INT'L Pmvi
67 (1962), 89 J. DRorr INT'L 718 (Cour d'appel Paris 1962), discussed in GOLD, supra note
17, at 143-53; Sharif v. Azad, [1967] 1 Q.B. 605, [1966] 3 All E.R. 785. Compare Perutz
v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953); South-
western Shipping Corp. v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d
509 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 1036, 178 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1st Dep't 1958), rev'd,
6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959) and
where the court states that an exchange contract is a contract which affects a country's
balance of payments. This definition appears overly broad in some respects. See Gold, The
Fund Agreement in the Courts-X, 19 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 468, 482-86 (1972).
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Of the three definitions of "exchange contract" only the first and third
are advocated today, and most contemporary textual authorities reject
the narrow construction and favor the broad one. The case law, of which
there is a great deal, is not so one-sided, and the courts are divided as
to whether the broad or narrow interpretation is preferred. European
courts favor the broad interpretation, while United States courts incline
toward the narrow view. 6 It is submitted, however, that the broad inter-
pretation is preferable on the basis of the international policy of cooper-
ation in monetary affairs which the Fund Agreement seeks to imple-
ment.37 Under this view, the letter of credit involved in the Zeevi case
is clearly an exchange contract within the broad construction of that
term.3
C. UGANDAN EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS AND THE FUND
AGREEMENT
A determination that the letter of credit in Zeevi was an "exchange
contract" within the meaning of the Fund Agreement still leaves two
remaining issues. The first is whether issuance of directives to the
Grindlays Bank constituted "imposing" exchange control regulations
within the meaning of that term in Article VIII, section 2(b). The sec-
ond, which arises after a determination of the first, is whether applica-
tion of those regulations was consistent with the Fund Agreement.
1. Imposition of Exchange Control Regulations
On their face the Ugandan regulations did not bar payment to Israeli
nationals, or payment "unless value in the form of goods was received,"
nor are they otherwise repugnant to the Fund Agreement. The regula-
tions as adopted by Uganda were prima facie consistent with the Fund
Agreement."9 However, application of these regulations through issuance
of the directives effectively barred payment by Grindlays to the Israeli
36. See cases cited in note 35 supra.
37. See Fund Agreement, art. I, which states that "[tihe purposes of the International
Monetary Fund are. . . [t]o promote international monetary cooperation. . ....
38. The letter of credit in Zeevi may also be within the narrow interpretation as well,
for it sought to transfer American dollars-clearly an international medium of payment-
from a resident of Uganda, the Grindlays Bank, to a nonresident, the Zeevi plaintiff.
Significantly, the Ugandan authorities asserted that the letter was subject to its exchange
control regulations.
39. Compare the United Kingdom Exchange Control Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14,
on which the Ugandan law is said to be modeled. Record at 88-92, J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd.
v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 44 App. Div. 2d 914, 355 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't
1974) (affidavit of Oliver John Keeble; Sept. 25, 1973, in support of defendant's cross
motion).
[Vol. 9:239
Foreign Exchange Control Regulation
plaintiffs, and hence it is necessary to inquire whether the word "im-
posed" in the first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b) connotes both
the application of exchange control regulations in a specific case as well
as the adoption of such regulations by governmental authority.
Unfortunately, the meaning of the term "imposed" has never been set
forth in full. Clearly, it means "adopted,"40 but whether it also connotes
"applied" is uncertain. On this point the travaux pr~paratoires of Arti-
cle VIII, section 2(b) shed no light, nor do the travaux pr~paratoires of
the other sections of the Fund Agreement where the terms "maintained
or imposed" or "imposed" appear .4 However, it would be absurd to hold
that Article VIII, section 2(b) was meant to reach only the written terms
of exchange control regulations and not actual specific application of
those regulations. The directives in the Zeevi case, moreover, had the
force of regulations. 4 2 If nothing more, these practical considerations
require that the term "imposed" include both the concept "adopted"
and the concept "applied." If this is so, application of the Ugandan
regulations is covered by the first sentence of section 2(b).
2. The Regulations and the Fund Agreement
If the regulations as applied were "imposed" within the meaning of
section 2(b), as argued above, the key question arises as to whether they
were consistent with the Fund Agreement. This, in turn, depends on the
reasons for Uganda's actions. If Uganda had applied the regulations to
thwart payments in furtherance of- a policy of economic or monetary
discrimination toward Israel and Israeli nationals, then those directive-
regulations were inconsistent with the Fund Agreement, for the Agree-
ment was designed to eliminate the sort of discriminatory monetary
practices which were characteristic of the international economy during
the Great Depression. 3 The primary purpose of the Fund is "to promote
40. MANN, supra note 17, at 446; Meyer, supra note 20, at 893; Williams, supra note 2,
at 357, 360.
41. The words "impose" or "maintained or imposed" appear in the Fund Agreement
at art. VIII, § 2(b); art. VIII, § 4(a) (ii); art. XI, § 2; art. XIV, § 2. For conference references
to the phrase in art. VIII, § 4(a)(ii), see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2866, 1 PROCEEDINGS
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE, July 1-22,
1944 [hereinafter cited as PROCS. AND Docs.], Doc. 32 at 32 (Alternative A), Doc. 144 at
156, Doc. 329 at 545-46, Doc. 413, at 671-72, Doc. 448, at 780-81. For references to art. XI,
§ 2, see PROCS. AND Docs., Doc. 374 at 607, Doc. 413 at 676, Doc. 448 at 785. Art. XIV, § 2
is discussed in Doc. 323 at 538, Doc. 413 at 682, Doc. 448 at 791-92.
42. Record at 90, J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 44 App. Div.
2d 914, 355 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1974) (affidavit of Oliver John Keeble, Sept. 25, 1973,
in support of defendant's cross motion).
43. Address by H. Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and
President of the Bretton Woods Conference, July 22, 1944, in PROcS. AND Docs. 1116-20.
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international monetary cooperation,"" and the Agreement specifies that
"no member shall engage in. . .any discriminatory currency arrange-
ments" except as authorized by the Fund Agreement or approved by
the Fund." Further, a Fund decision has noted that "members will
be expected to proceed with all feasible speed in eliminating . . .
["discriminatory restrictions imposed for balance of payments rea-
sons"] against member countries."4 There is no evidence in the record
that the Fund ever approved of Uganda's alleged discriminatory restric-
tions,4" and hence the regulations, if they were imposed in alleged fur-
therance of a policy of economic discrimination, would be inconsistent
with the Fund Agreement. Accordingly, Article VIII, section 2(b) would
not apply and the parties would be left to a determination of their rights
based on usual conflict of laws analysis. If, on the other hand, the
directives were issued to halt payments because value in the form of
goods had not been received in Uganda" and issuance of such directives
was customary in these circumstances, then application of the regula-
tions may not have been inconsistent with the Fund Agreement. In that
case Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement would apply in bar
See also R. GARDNER, STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 75-80 (1969); H. JOHNSON, THE WORLD
ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS 20-35 (1965); J. WILLIAMS, POSTWAR MONETARY PLANS 191-
215 (3d ed. 1947); L. YEAGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS 251-358 (1966);
Hearings on H.R. 3314 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945); Hearings on H.R. 2211 Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); Hudson, Epitaph for Bretton Woods, 23 J. INT'L
AFF. 266, 269 (1969).
44. Fund Agreement, art. I (iii): Another purpose of the Fund is "to promote exchange
stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid com-
petitive exchange depreciation." See also id., art. IV, § 4(a).
45. Fund Agreement, art. VIII, § 3. Compare the 1948 French problem of franc devalua-
tion discussed in 1 J. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965 at 200-
204 (1969).
46. IMF Decision No. 955-(59/45) of Oct. 23, 1959, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 119-20 (7th
issue 1975).
47. Nor did the parties petition the Fund for a ruling on whether Uganda's directive-
regulations were consistent with the Fund Agreement, although the Fund solicits such
petitions. See the Fund interpretation of article VIII, § 2(b), in 1949 IMF ANN. REP., App.
XIV, at 83; Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 11 Misc. 2d
397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 1036, 178 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1st
Dep't 1958), rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied, 361 U.S.
895 (1959); Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 221 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (S.D. Fla. 1963),
aff'd, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966).
48. J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 227, 333
N.E.2d 168, 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 899. See Record at 97, J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v.
Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 44 App. Div. 2d 914, 355 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1974)
(letter from Bank of Uganda Exchange Control Dep't to Grindlays Bank, April 13, 1972).
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of the Zeevi plaintiffs' claims. Under the circumstances, and because
summary judgment was sought, the Court of Appeals might have re-
manded the case for resolution of these issues of fact. 9
D. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE AND THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Assuming that the first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b) does not
apply in this case,50 the doctrine of impossibility of performance would
not bar recovery." Although impossibility of performance caused by the
law, decree or administrative action of a foreign country is in general a
valid defense in American courts to an action for breach of contract,52
where the contract is performable in the United States, as in this case,
American courts will not give effect to a foreign law, decree or act of
state, unless it is consistent with our law. 3 Thus, the act of the Ugandan
exchange control authorities does not bar recovery against Grindlays
Bank funds held in Citibank.
The act of the Ugandan authorities, moreover, was not in itself an act
of state barring recovery in the United States,54 and the court's decision
on the choice of law question could have been decided either way.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the apparently abrupt withdrawal of its endorsement
of the "national policy of cooperation with Bretton Woods signatories"
49. The record is also unclear as to whether the directives forever barred Grindlays
Bank from honoring the letter of credit or whether, on proper application, the Ugandan
authorities would have granted the Bank permission to pay Zeevi pursuant to that letter.
50. For this analysis it is immaterial whether New York or Ugandan law controls, since
both recognize impossibility as a bar. For discussions of the choice of law point, see J.
Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y. 2d 220, 226-27, 333 N.E.2d
168, 172-73, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 898-99; Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 24
N.Y.2d 372, 382, 248 N.E.2d 576, 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, 825 (1969) and cases therein cited.
51. The Ugandan action making the Zeevi letter of credit unenforceable in that country
"was of no force in New York and the doctrine of impossibility of performance lends no
comfort to defendant." J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d
220, 228, 333 N.E.2d 168, 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 899.
52. Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921); Holzer v. Deutsche R.G.,
277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938); Horlock v. Beal, [1916] 1 A.C. 486; UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 2-615.
53. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens et al., 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1936), aff'd, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1936); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266
N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); Frankel & Co. v. L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 243, 167
N.E. 430 (1929); Glynn v. United Steel Works Corp., 160 Misc. 405, 289 N.Y.S. 1037 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
54. The New York Court of Appeals correctly determined this issue. J. Zeevi & Sons,
Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 333 N.E.2d 168, 174, 371
N.Y.S.2d 892, 900 (1975).
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and "an expansive application of the IMF agreement" announced in the
Banco Brasileiro case,55 the New York Court of Appeals in its unanimous
opinion in the Zeevi case did not recognize its obligation to begin the
analysis by determining whether Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund
Agreement was applicable. If that provision is taken as controlling, the
weight of authority favors inclusion of the Zeevi letter of credit within
the purview of the term "exchange contract," under either a broad or a
narrow construction of that term. Whether the Ugandan exchange con-
trol regulations invoked to bar plaintiffs' claim were imposed consis-
tently with the Fund Agreement, however, is not wholly free from doubt
in fact. For that reason the court in reviewing a summary judgment
might have remanded the case for further proceedings. By doing other-
wise, the Court of Appeals has only further clouded the law regarding
extraterritorial enforcement of exchange control regulations under the
International Monetary Fund Agreement.
55. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
